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When considering the incentive of a monopolist to adopt an innovation, the textbook model assumes
that it can instantaneously and seamlessly introduce the new technology. In fact, firms often face major
problems in integrating new technologies. In some cases, firms have to (temporarily) produce at levels
substantially below capacity upon adoption. We call such phenomena switchover disruptions, and
present extensive evidence on them. If firms face switchover disruptions, then they may temporarily
lose some unit sales upon adoption. If the firm loses unit sales, then a cost of adoption is the foregone
rents on the sales of those units. Hence, greater market power will mean higher prices on those lost
units of output, and hence a reduced incentive to innovate. We introduce switchover disruptions into
some standard models in the literature, show they can overturn some famous results, and then show
they can help explain evidence that firms in more competitive environments are more likely to adopt
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Consider the incentive of a ﬁrm to adopt a process innovation that lowers unit costs. Does
it matter whether the ﬁrm has extensive market power or operates in a competitive environ-
ment? Standard textbook economics (dating from the seminal contribution of Arrow (1962))
says market power matters only to the extent that it aﬀects the output of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm
should adopt only if the savings in production costs covers the ﬁxed cost of adoption, and for
a given level of output this calculation does not depend on market power. Yet there is evi-
dence, and a rapidly growing body of it, that shows ﬁrms in more competitive environments
are more likely to adopt technologies and increase productivity (see for example Schmitz
(2005), Treﬂer (2002) and the discussion below). And this is true even in situations where
changes in market conditions do not have an impact on output. The standard textbook logic
is at a loss to explain this evidence.
In this paper, we argue that there is a strong implicit assumption in the textbook story.
When we relax this assumption, economic logic now tells us that ﬁr m si nm o r ec o m p e t i t i v e
environments are more likely to adopt than ﬁrms with market power. The textbook model
assumes that ﬁrms can instantaneously and seamlessly introduce new technologies. In fact,
ﬁrms often face major problems in integrating new technologies. In some cases, ﬁrms have
to (temporarily) produce at levels substantially below capacity upon adoption. We call such
phenomena switchover disruptions, and present extensive evidence on them below. If ﬁrms
face switchover disruptions, then they may temporarily lose some unit sales upon adoption.
If the ﬁrm loses unit sales, then a cost of adoption is the foregone rents on the sales of those
units. This is the connection between market power and the incentive to innovate. Greater
market power will mean higher prices on those lost units of output, and hence higher lost
rents, and those higher lost rents means reduced incentive to innovate.
Having switchover disruptions, then, can change the economic logic as to how increases
in market power inﬂuence the decision to adopt technology. We illustrate this in two classic
models of monopoly and the incentive-to-innovate, the original model of Arrow (1962), and
the well known critique by Gilbert and Newbery (1982) (see, for example, Tirole (1988) for a
presentation of these models). We change the adoption technology in both models, from one
where costs seamlessly fall upon adoption, to one with switchover disruptions. We show that
1results in both models–results about how changes in market power change the incentive
to innovate–can be “overturned” when we use the adoption technology with switchover
disruptions rather than “standard” technology. Let us brieﬂy provide some details of our
analysis.
Consider a ﬁrm in an industry that has an advantage over rivals. We call this the
incumbent ﬁrm and it initially has a marginal cost of c◦.T h e r ea r erival ﬁrms each having a
marginal cost c◦+τ,f o rτ ≥ 0. The parameter τ w i l lg o v e r nt h ed e g r e eo fm a r k e tp o w e rt h a t
the incumbent has over its rivals. One interpretation of the parameter is that the incumbent
is a domestic ﬁrm and the rivals are foreign ﬁrms. Foreign ﬁrms have the same production
cost as the incumbent, but they must incur an additional cost of τ per unit which could be
at a r i ﬀ or a transportation cost.
There is a new technology with a ﬁxed cost to adopt. If adopted by a ﬁrm, its marginal
cost begins at c a n dt h e nf a l l so v e rt i m et oc,w h e r ec <c o. If costs are immediately lower,
that is, c<c ◦, then this is the standard case considered in the literature. Our generalization
is to allow costs to be initially higher, that is, c>c ◦. There are many reasons why costs
may be initially higher and we discuss these below. Such phenomenon are often labeled as
glitches, bumps in the road, or kinks in the system. To ﬁx ideas, we’ll just say that when
c>c ◦,t h e r ei saswitchover disruption.
How does the incentive of the incumbent and rivals to adopt the new technology depend
on market power in the industry, that is, on τ? In order to address this question, we must
make more assumptions regarding the environment, such as the strategies available to the
ﬁrms. There are two classic ways of specifying the environment, and we consider both.
The ﬁrst approach follows Arrow (1962). Here the incumbent alone has a choice to adopt.
The incumbent can pay a ﬁxed cost to adopt the new technology or not. If the incumbent
does adopt, the rivals can be excluded and the rivals’ costs remain at c◦ +τ. The essence of
the Arrow setup is that the incumbent is choosing between having the new technology for
itself and no one having it.
The second approach follows Gilbert and Newbery (1982). Here an outsider does research.
The outsider sells the fruits of its research to the highest bidder which could be the incumbent
or a rival ﬁrm. The essence of the Gilbert and Newbery setup is that the incumbent is
2choosing between having the new technology for itself and a rival having it.
Now consider the impact of increasing market power. Consider ﬁrst the Arrow-environment.
With the standard technology for adoption, increasing market power leads to a decrease in
the incumbent’s incentive to innovate if demand is elastic (sometimes called the replacement
eﬀect) due to the reduced output produced when market power expands. If demand is inelas-
tic, increasing market power has no impact on incentives (as we suggested above). However,
if there are switchover disruptions, and they are “large” enough (so that the incumbent tem-
porarily loses units sales), then increasing market power decreases the incentive to innovate.
In this sense, switchover disruption overturns results in the Arrow model.
Next consider the Gilbert and Newbery-environment. With the standard adoption tech-
nology, the incumbent always has a greater willingness to pay than the rival, and the in-
cumbent’s willingness to pay increases when market power is increased (sometimes called
the eﬃciency eﬀect). Hence, increases in market power lead to increases in industry inno-
vation. Next, we consider technology adoption with switchover disruption. We show that
with “enough” switchover disruption, increases in market power now lead to decreases in
industry innovation. For not very large switchover disruption, the incumbent still has a
greater willingness to pay than the rival, but the incumbent’s willingness to pay decreases
when market power is increased. For very large switchover disruption, the rival in fact has
a greater willingness to pay (and its willingness is decreasing in market power). As in the
Arrow model, then, adding switchover costs overturns results in the Gilbert-Newbery model.
The incentive-to-innovate literature has, obviously, grown signiﬁc a n t l yi nt h el a s t2 5
years following the Arrow and Gilbert-Newbery debate. Reinganum (1983) made important
contributions. It has also extended into more traditional oligopoly models. In fact, there are
recent papers that exhaustively look at the incentive-to-innovate literature in these models
(see, Vives (2008) and Schmutzler (2007) for a synthesis of this literature). But all this
literature, as far as we know, has assumed that ﬁrms can instantaneously and seamlessly
introduce new technologies.1 Switchover disruptions are not considered.
There is an old saying “if you have a good thing going, don’t rock the boat.” Here, a
1In some papers there is uncertainty regarding how long it may take to develop an innovation. Similarly,
there are models where there is uncertainty as to how much better an innovation will be. But once an
innovation is developed, it can be seamlessly adopted.
3ﬁrm with a lucrative monopoly may decide not to adopt a technology that, in the short-run,
disturbs its lucrative position. There is another old saying “if you have nothing to lose, swing
for the fences.” There are recent papers that have attempted to capture this idea in models
where ﬁrm’s R&D investment is a choice of variance in outcomes (see, e.g., Anderson and
Cabral (2007)). The point is to show that ﬁrms that are far behind may decide to choose
high variance R&D programs. Again, switchover disruptions are not considered.
Having switchover disruptions in economic models is by no means new. There is a large
literature where switchover disruptions play an important role, for example, in Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1996), Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Klenow (1998), Parente (1994) and Schivardi
and Schneider (2008). A major focus of these papers has been to see how switchover dis-
ruption inﬂuences investment. In that sense, they are close cousins to this paper. However,
they have not considered how switchover disruptions in adopting technology might change
the relationship between market power and the incentive to innovate.
In Section 2, we provide extensive evidence that ﬁrms face switchover disruptions when
adopting technology. Section 3 provides the basic model. In Sections 4 and 5, we look at the
incentive to innovate in the Arrow and Gilbert-Newbery environments, respectively. Section
6 provides some extensions of the model. In Section 7 we conclude by returning to discuss
further evidence on switchover disruptions. Here we discuss evidence on how changes in
market power changed the incentives of ﬁrms to adopt technology.
2 Motivating Switchover Disruption
We use this section to motivate introducing switchover disruptions into the incentive-to-
innovate literature. In particular, this section provides evidence that ﬁrms often experience
such disruptions when they adopt new technologies. In fact, of course, some new technologies
never succeed.
One note before we begin. If new technologies can yield higher costs than old ones, ﬁrms
would obviously run “pilot” projects to learn if new technologies were better or not. Firms
obviously do this. But as argued and seen below, for many technologies testing can only
reduce uncertainty a modest amount. Pilot projects can often test only one dimension of the
4technology in isolation from others. To know if a technology works can only be learned by
turning on all the systems at once. And then the system must be run for substantial periods
of time before the productivity of the technology is learned. In this paper, we do not delve
into why technology has this feature but explore its consequences.2
Let us start by presenting evidence on switchover disruptions faced by three well-known
ﬁrms. We then turn to more formal studies, looking at switchover costs in manufacturing,
supply-chains, and in organizational innovation in general.
2.1 Switchover Costs in Speciﬁc Adoption Episodes
When discussing evidence, we think its productive to begin with concrete examples of
switchover disruptions. We’ll give three such cases, though a much larger list is easy to
compile. The speciﬁc episodes are not meant to be a “test” of our model (i.e., one should
n o tb ea s k i n gw h e t h e rt h eﬁrms have lots of, or little, market power), but simply evidence
that disruption is important. A more productive way to test the idea is to look at cases
where ﬁrms faced large changes in market power, and ask how this changed their adoption
decisions. Again, we discuss this in the conclusion.
Boeing. For building the 787 Dreamliner, Boeing chose a new technology, one that in-
volved its suppliers assembling more of the parts oﬀ-site than usual, and then shipping to
Boeing for ﬁnal assembly. Such a process had been pursued successfully in other manufac-
turing industries. However, Boeing has faced major problems — switchover disruptions — in
implementing the technology. Suppliers have been slow to send assembled parts, spurring
Boeing to request suppliers to ship unassembled work to them. But “Boeing has ended up
with a pile of parts and wires, and lots of questions about how they all ﬁt together, not unlike
a frustrating Christmas morning at home.” With ever growing delays in promised delivery
dates, Boeing may lose substantial business to Airbus. Its clear that it is taking Boeing a
substantial period of time to learn whether the new system is better than the old.3
General Motors. In the 1980s, after suﬀering large losses in market share to Japanese
2A related issue is why a ﬁrm does not immediately switch back to its old technology if costs initially
increase with adoption. Again, it is not possible to do so in many (all?) cases as is also seen below.
3See coverage in the New York Times, January 16, 2008, “Boeing is Expected to Disclose Further Delays
..” and January 17, 2008, “Supplier Woes Lead to New Delay of Boeing 787.”
5producers, General Motors (GM) invested heavily in automation and robots in order to stem
losses in market share. But when factories reopened with their new automation systems,
there were major production problems. Robots often did not run. When they did, they
“often began dismembering each other, smashing cars, spraying paint everywhere and even
ﬁtting the wrong equipment.” GM found that “technologies that worked well in isolated pilot
projects [weren’t] easily coordinated in the real world of high-volume manufacturing.” Many
of the factories were able to produce only a small share of their rated capacity for months
and months.4
United Airlines. When a new Denver airport was built in the mid 1990s, United Airlines
and the city decided to install a highly automated baggage handling system. There were
major switchover disruptions. The system “immediately became known for its ability to
mangle and misplace a good portion of everything that wandered into its path.” A year after
opening, United sued the builder of the system claiming it “performed miserably.” For the
ﬁrst decade of operation, United used only a stripped down version of the system. Finally,
United decided to turn the system oﬀ in 2005.5
2.2 Switchover Costs in Manufacturing
Steel Manufacturing. Nakamura and Ohashi (2005) examine the experience of Japanese
steel manufacturers when they shifted from the open-hearth furnace (OHF) to the basic
oxygen furnace (BOF) in the 1950s and 1960s. They found that plants adopting the new
technology experienced signiﬁcant declines in productivity (TFP) at the time of adoption.
They estimated a 14% drop in productivity initially, and that it was three years before the
BOF-productivity approached the level of the old OHF-productivity.
General Manufacturing. Some researchers have looked at the productivity experience
of manufacturing plants after they have undergone a major surge in investment. Using
4For coverage see “When GM’s Robots Ran Amok,” The Economist, 8/10/91, Vol. 320, Issue 7719,
“Tricky Auto Makers Discover ‘Factory of the Future’ is Headache Just Now,” The Wall Street Journal, May
13, 1986, “Detroit Stumbles on Its Way to the Future,” BusinessWeek, June 16, 1986.
5United’s lease (in 2002) requires it to pay the city $60 million a year for the automated system (for 25
years). Hence, United must swallow this loss. However, United will reduce its operating costs by returning
to manual baggage handling, and expects to save $12 million a year on these costs.For coverage of this story,
see “United Abandons Denver Baggage System,” Associated Press, June 7, 2005, and “Denver Airport Saw
the Future. It Didn’t Work,” New York Times, August 27, 2005.
6these surges as proxies for adoption of technology, they have found that productivity has
initially fallen after adoption. Studies include Huggett and Ospina (2001) who looked at what
happened to trend productivity growth after adoption, and Sakellaris (2004) who looked at
the impact on levels of productivity.
2.3 Switchover Costs in Supply-Chain Management
Changes in supply-chain systems will almost certainly cause switchover disruptions. There
is no way of knowing if a system is better without trying it. Boeing is now in the process
of such learning. There is a thriving literature in operations research and management that
has studied the consequences of supply chain disruptions, brought on by glitches in moving
to new technology and other sources of disruption. The literature has found large losses in
productivity and share value as a result of glitches (see, e.g., Hendricks and Singhal (2003,
2005) and references therein).
2.4 Switchover Costs in Organizational Changes
Organizational changes will almost certainly cause switchover disruptions. A new organi-
zational structure might be better or worse, but there is really no way of knowing without
the entire organization trying it. If it is worse, there is no way to switch back to the old
organization overnight if at all. We’ll discuss a few areas in which ﬁrms attempt to improve
their organizations (and lower their production costs).
Work Rule Changes. A subset of organizational innovation involves ﬁrms changing work
rules of a union. Here it may be clear that a new set of work rules (more ﬂexible ones) would
lead to much lower costs. Yet introducing the changes might lead to a union strike and a
considerable period of downtime. Indeed there are many episodes where ﬁr m sw e r es h u t
down for long periods before being able to change the work rules, and in some instances,
were not able to change them at all.
A Potpourri of Workplace Changes. To ﬁnish our motivation of adding switchover dis-
ruption, lets list a few departments in organizations, and papers describing switchover dis-
ruptions upon innovation in these departments. Marketing departments have faced disrup-
7tions introducing sales force automation technology (see, e.g., Speier and Venkatesh (2002)).
Human resource departments have faced disruptions in introducing new workplace com-
pensation schemes (see, e.g., Beer and Cannon (2004)). And, of course, introducing new
information technology systems often leads to signiﬁcant disruptions (see, e.g., Ginzberg
(1981)).
3M o d e l
Consider an industry with demand function D(p). We will distinguish between the downward-
sloping demand case where D0(p) < 0 and the inelastic case where there is a reservation price
θ for a unit demand, that is, D(p)=1 ,f o rp ≤ θ and D(p)=0for p>θ .
There is a ﬁrm in the industry that has an advantage over rivals. We call this the
incumbent and it initially has a marginal cost of c◦.T h e r ea r eas e to f( m o r et h a no n e )r i v a l
ﬁrms each having a marginal cost equal to c◦ + τ,f o rτ ≥ 0.T h ep a r a m e t e rτ will govern
the degree of market power that the incumbent has over its rivals. One interpretation of the
parameter is that the incumbent is a domestic ﬁrm and the rivals are foreign ﬁrms. All ﬁrms
have the same production cost c◦, but the foreign ﬁrms must incur an additional cost of τ
per unit which could be a tariﬀ or a transportation cost. The parameter τ will be the key
element in our comparative statics.
Deﬁne the pure monopoly price at the initial marginal cost of c◦ to be
p
M
0 =a r gm a x
p (p − c
◦)D(p).
Assume that pM
0 ≥ c◦ + τ.6 Suppose that the ﬁrms compete in a Bertrand fashion. Thus, if
the incumbent’s cost remains at the initial level c◦ and the rivals’ at c◦ +τ, the equilibrium
price from Bertrand competition is the limit price p0 = c◦ + τ and all sales go to the
incumbent.
There exists a new technology. To explain the new technology, we introduce a time
dimension in the model. Production takes place over a unit time interval t ∈ [0,1].I fi tw e r e
6Make the further technical assumption that for any cost c, monopoly proﬁt (p−c)D(p) is single-peaked
in price.
8not for the new technology, introducing the time element would add nothing, as demand and
c o s tw o u l db ec o n s t a n to v e rt i m ea n dt h ea n a l y s i sc o u l dg ot h r o u g ha st h o u g hi tw e r ej u s t
a static problem. The dynamics play a role when the new technology is adopted because in
this case cost varies over time.
Speciﬁcally, assume that if the new technology is adopted at time t =0 , then marginal
cost at time t equals ct = f(t) where f(·) is a continuous strictly decreasing function,
f0(t) < 0.L e t ¯ c = f(0) be the high initial cost and c = f(1) be the low cost ultimately
attained, c < ¯ c.
It will be convenient in the analysis to integrate over the cost path c(t) rather than over
t.F o r f o r c ∈ [c,¯ c],l e tG(c) denote how much time remains when marginal cost equals c.
That is, G(c) is the value of x solving f(1 − x)=c.T h u s G(¯ c)=1and G(c)=0 ,a n d
0 <G (c) < 1 for c <c<¯ c. The c.d.f. over marginal cost during the time interval is 1−G(·)
and let g(c)=−G0(c) be the density of marginal cost. Finally, letting ρ be the discount
rate, deﬁne h(c) as
h(c) ≡ e
−ρ(1−G(c))g(c).( 1 )
This will show up in the formulas below as the weight on proﬁts when cost is c.T h e ﬁrst
term takes into account discounting, since the time is t =1− G(c) when cost is c.T h e
second term takes into account the density of c.
We assume that c <c ◦ so that ultimately the new technology is better than the original.
The key innovation in our analysis is to allow for the possibility that ¯ c>c ◦.W h e n t h a t
happens we say there is a switchover disruption at the initial point of adoption. Figure 1
illustrates an example. We can think of there being some prior period t ∈ [−1,0) over which
cost was constant at c◦. When the new technology is adopted, marginal cost goes up initially,
but eventually is lower.
The next issue is: Who gets to adopt the new technology? There are two classic ways
of setting this up in the literature and we consider both. The ﬁrst approach follows Arrow
(1962). Here the incumbent alone has a choice to adopt. The incumbent can pay a ﬁxed cost
to adopt the new technology or pay no ﬁxed cost and use the original technology instead. If
the incumbent does adopt, the rivals can be excluded and the rivals’ ﬁxed cost remains at
c◦ + τ. The essence of the Arrow setup is that the incumbent is choosing between having
9the new technology for itself and no one having it.
The second approach follows Gilbert and Newbery (1982). Here an outsider is doing
research. The outsider can sell the fruits of its research to the highest bidder which could
potentially be the incumbent ﬁrm or a rival ﬁrm. The essence of the Gilbert and Newbery
setup is that the incumbent is choosing between having the new technology for itself and a
rival having it.
4 Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate: Arrow
In this section we take the Arrow setup and work through the comparative statics of how
the incentive to innovate depends upon the monopoly power parameter τ.
We begin our analysis by ﬁrst conﬁguring our model so that it is equivalent to the standard
setup and then rederiving the standard result. We do this by initially supposing that ¯ c ≤ c◦
meaning there is no switchover disruption. Costs fall right away upon adoption and improve
after that. We examine the incentive of the incumbent to innovate in this situation.
As explained earlier, if the incumbent does not innovate, the equilibrium price from
Bertrand competition will be p◦ = c◦+τ y i e l d i n gap r o ﬁtm a r g i no fτ = p◦−c◦ per unit sold.
The incumbent’s sales will be Q◦ = D(c◦ + τ) at each instant along the unit time interval.
If the incumbent adopts, it obtains a cost path that starts with ¯ c and decreases to c over
the unit interval. Following the terminology in the literature, assume that c is not a drastic
cost reduction relative to c◦ so that the monopoly price at cost c remains above c◦+τ.T h u s
if the incumbent adopts, it continues to set the limit price p0 = c◦ + τ at each time instant,
s oq u a n t i t ys o l db yt h ei n c u m b e n ti st h es a m ew h e t h e ro rn o ti ti n n o v a t e s . T h e r e f o r e ,f o r







◦ + τ − c]dc (2)
where “No_SD” denotes no switchover disruption. Note it is convenient to integrate over
cost rather than time and we are using the weight h(c) deﬁn e di n( 1 )t h a tt a k e si n t oa c c o u n t
discounting and the density of c.
10Analogously, the present value of not adopting is (p◦ − c◦)D(c◦ + τ). Subtracting this










◦ + τ) (3)
This is the present value of the savings in variable cost from the new technology. Now
suppose there is some ﬁxed cost F of adoption. It is immediate that the incumbent adopts
if the value of adoption W exceeds the cost F.
We are interested in comparative statics with τ.If we think of the ﬁxed cost F as having
been drawn from some continuous distribution, then if W
No_SD
Arrow decreases in τ, the incumbent
is less likely to adopt with more market power τ.
In the downward sloping demand case where D0(p) < 0, it is immediate from (3) that
W
No_SD
Arrow is strictly decreasing in the degree of market power τ.T h i s i s a v e r s i o n o f a
well-known result due to Arrow that is called the replacement eﬀect. The economics is
straightforward. Adoption of the new technology involves the payment of a ﬁxed cost to
lower marginal cost. The greater the monopoly power τ, the lower the production volume
D(c◦+τ) over which to spread the ﬁxed cost of innovation and therefore the less the incentive
to pay this ﬁxed cost.
Hereafter we focus on the inelastic demand case where D(c◦ + τ) is constant at unity.
With the standard adoption technology, that is, ¯ c ≤ c◦, so there is no switchover disruption,
it is immediate that the willingness to pay for an innovation in (3) is constant in τ.I no t h e r
words, in the inelastic demand case, increasing market power does not change the incentives
to adopt.
Now assume there is switchover disruption, meaning ¯ c>c ◦. For very small switchover
disruption–¯ c very close to c◦–the results above will apply. So, we focus on the case where
the switchover disruption is “big” relative to market power, in particular, we consider com-
parative statics from changing τ in the range τ ∈ (0,¯ c − c◦).F o rs u c hτ and ¯ c,t h e r ei sa n
initial time interval over which the incumbent is no longer the low cost producer. The in-
cumbent must wait until its cost falls to c◦+τ before it again becomes the low-cost producer.






◦ + τ − c]dc (4)
where “SD” denotes switchover disruption. The willingness to pay for the innovation is the











where recall D(c◦ +τ) is unity. Note that if the incumbent adopts, it only enjoys proﬁts for
c in the range [c,c ◦ +τ]. In contrast, if it had not adopted, it would have enjoyed a proﬁto f








h(c)dc < 0,f o rτ<(¯ c − c
◦).( 6 )
Now if τ is greater than (¯ c − c◦), then the incumbent adopting the new technology holds
onto the market even initially. And so the eﬀect of a change in τ is zero. The eﬀe c tw ea r e
talking about comes into play when the increase in marginal cost at the point of switchover
is big enough relative to the monopoly friction that the incumbent is initially not the low
cost producer.
These last results are illustrated in Figure 2. In that ﬁgure, there are two identical panels,
except that the switchover disruption in the left hand panel is “small” (that is, c◦ + τ>¯ c)
and is “large” in the right hand panel. Assume that there is no discounting. Then the
dark shaded area in both panels represents the total proﬁts that are lost as a result of the
disruption, and the light shaded area are the proﬁts that are gained when costs fall below
original costs. In the left hand panel, increases in τ do not change either shaded area. In the
right hand panel, increases in τ increase the size of the dark shaded area, and hence makes
innovation less likely.
We summarize the results of this section with
Proposition 1. Assume the Arrow setup applies. (i) Suppose demand is elastic. If there is no
switchover disruption (¯ c ≤ c◦), then W
No_SD
Arrow strictly decreases in the monopoly parameter τ.
12(ii) Suppose demand is inelastic. If there is no switchover disruption (¯ c ≤ c◦), then W
No_SD
Arrow
is constant in τ. Suppose there is a switchover disruption (¯ c>c ◦). Then WSD
Arrow strictly
decreases in τ for τ ∈ (0,¯ c − c◦).
An important point before moving on. In the case of a large switchover disruption, the
monopolist loses its entire market for a period of time. This, of course, is simply an artifact
of the simple model above. The monopolist does not have to lose its entire market in order
for the eﬀect we are talking about to be important. There are other ways to set up the
model, and in which Proposition 1 still obtains, in which the incumbent loses only a part of
its market when it adopts the technology. For example, the incumbent could face its rivals
in many markets (and not just one) and have a large cost advantage (i.e., large τ)i ns o m e ,
and a small cost advantage in others. Upon adoption, it will be a low cost producer in some
markets, but not others. Below we present an such an extension of the model.
5 Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate: Gilbert
and Newbery
We begin with details of the environment. An outside researcher has an opportunity to
engage in research to develop the new technology. If it innovates, it can sell exclusive rights
to use the technology to the incumbent or one of the rivals. If a rival uses the new technology,
it still needs to pay the friction τ, in addition to the marginal production cost. Assume that
the outside researcher can commit to an auction technology that extracts the full surplus
from the bidder with the highest willingness to pay. Let W
NO_SD
GN and WSD
GN be deﬁned as
the willingness to pay of the highest bidder in the case there is not a switchover disruption
and there is a switchover disruption respectively. The object of this section is to determine
how willingness to pay varies with τ. Furthermore, we will be interested in determining
the identity of the highest bidder, the incumbent or a rival? To abstract away from the
replacement-eﬀect type issues, we focus on the case of perfectly inelastic demand.
We begin with some additional notation. As in the previous section, let v denote the
present value to the incumbent when it acquires the new technology. Now let u denote the
13present value to the incumbent when a rival obtains the new technology. Finally, let r be
the present value to a rival when it acquires the new technology.
5.1 Adoption with no switchover disruption
We begin with the case of no switchover disruption, ¯ c ≤ c◦.T h e v a l u e vNo_SD to the
incumbent of acquiring the rights to the new technology is the same as formula (2) in the
previous subsection (with D(c◦ + τ) a tu n i t y ) .N o t et h a th e r ew ed o n ’ tn e e dt ow o r r yt h a t
the incumbent will buy the technology and leave it idle, as this is never optimal without
a switchover disruption. (We will have to worry about this possibility when we examine






h(c)[c + τ − c
◦]dc.( 7 )
By using the max operator in (7) above, we subsume diﬀerent cases. If max{¯ c,c◦ − τ} =
c◦ − τ (equivalently c◦ ≥ ¯ c + τ), the incumbent is immediately undercut at the point of
adoption by a rival and the integral above is 0 (limits of integration are c◦ − τ and c◦ − τ).
If alternatively c◦ < ¯ c + τ, the incumbent is at least initially the low cost producer, taking
into account the friction τ, but it will have to set the price to c + τ to match the adopting
rival.






◦ − τ − c]dc,
where, again, by using the min operator above we subsume diﬀerent cases.
The maximum willingness to pay for the rights to the new innovation is
W
No_SD











c h(c)[c◦ + τ − c]dc −
R max{¯ c,c◦−τ}
max{c◦−τ,c} h(c)[c + τ − c◦]dc,
R min{¯ c,c◦−τ}





14The ﬁrst term in the maximization is the willingness to pay by the incumbent, the diﬀerence
in return between having the production rights and a rival having them. The second term
is the return to a rival owning the rights (a rival without rights gets proﬁt equal to zero.)








◦ − c]dc,w h e nτ =0 ,
the present value of the cost reduction. This expression follows from the fact that, with no
switchover disruption, max{¯ c,c◦ − τ} =m a x{c◦ − τ,c} = c◦ (when τ =0 ), and min{¯ c,c◦ − τ} =
¯ c and min{c,c ◦ − τ} = c. Next observe that the willingness to pay rNo_SD of the rival strictly




















◦ − τ} + τ − c
◦],
and ﬁnally Z max{¯ c,c◦−τ}
max{c◦−τ,c}
h(c)dc.
The ﬁrst two terms are zero (in each term, either the derivatives are zero, or if not, the rest




















15This last derivative is strictly positive if τ<c ◦ −c and zero for τ ≥ c◦ −c. Hence for τ>0,
the willingness to pay by the incumbent strictly exceeds that of the rival, and the willingness
strictly increases in τ up to the threshold. In summary, we have proved:
Proposition 2. Assume the Gilbert and Newbery setup applies, that demand is perfectly
inelastic, and that there is no switchover disruption (¯ c ≤ c◦).
(i) If τ>0, the incumbent has a higher willingness to pay for the new innovation and so
will outbid the rival so W
No_SD
GN =vNo_SD − uNo_SD.
(ii) W
No_SD
GN strictly increases in τ for τ<c ◦ − c and is constant above this point.
Part (i) of the proposition is a variant of Gilbert and Newbery’s famous result that
innovation is worth more to the incumbent than a new entrant and so the incumbent will
preemptively patent before a rival. The incumbent will take into account that if it does not
preemptively innovate and the entrant adopts instead, the incumbent will lose its monopoly
rent. In contrast, the rivals have no rent to forego if they don’t innovate.
Part (ii) of the result is really an elaboration on part (i). The larger is τ the larger is the
incentive of the incumbent to hold onto its monopoly rents and so the more the incumbent
is willing pay for the innovation. This remains true until τ>c ◦ − c. When the friction is
bigger than this threshold, a rival cannot displace the incumbent even when its costs have
fallen to c. So the incumbent will enjoy the full value of the friction τ whether or not the
incumbent or a rival have the new technology, meaning changes in τ don’t impact willingness
to pay.
5.2 Adoption with switchover disruption
The intuition embodied in Proposition 2 for how monopoly can raise the incentive to pay
for innovation is well understood. The key point we want to make here is that this result
depends heavily on the assumption that there are no switchover disruptions. We will show
that the presence of switchover disruptions can overturn the results in Proposition 2. Note
that we must now allow the possibility that the incumbent buys the technology and leaves
it idle.











Here Hdisrupt is the (weighted) duration of the switchover disruption, where the weight de-
pends upon the cost density and the discount factor, and Hbeyond is the (weighted) duration
“beyond the disruption,” when cost is lower than its initial value c◦.
We start by determining what happens when the degree of market power τ is small.
Proposition 3. Assume the Gilbert and Newbery setup applies, that demand is perfectly
inelastic, and that there is a period of switchover disruption (¯ c>c ◦). Suppose that τ is
small.
(i) If Hdisrupt <H beyond, then the incumbent obtains the innovation and WSD
GN strictly in-
creases in τ.
(ii) If Hdisrupt ∈ (Hbeyond,2Hbeyond), then the incumbent still obtains the innovation, but
WSD
GN strictly decreases in τ.
(iii) If Hdisrupt > 2Hbeyond, then a rival obtains the innovation and WSD
GN strictly decreases in
τ.
Proof. Suppose ¯ c>c ◦ and τ ∈ (0,c ◦−c). To do the analysis, we need to derive four diﬀerent
returns.
First Return: vSD






◦ + τ − c]dc (8)
where if min{c◦ + τ,¯ c} =¯ c, the incumbent is always the low cost producer.
Second Return: iSD
This is the return if the incumbent acquires the rights to the new technology but leaves
it idle. Hence no rival adopts. We ignored this possibility in the non-disruption case because






since the markup is τ, and demand is unity.
Third Return: uSD
This is the return to the incumbent of not acquiring the technology (so that it ends up








h(c)[c + τ − c
◦]dc.( 9 )
The ﬁrst term is the return over the disruption interval, that is, the time before the adopting
rival’s cost (not including the friction τ) has fallen to c◦, that is, the interval [c◦,c].T h e
adopting rival begins with total cost c + τ (which satisﬁes c + τ>c ◦ + τ>c ◦), but since
there are other rivals (we assumed multiple rivals) with cost c◦ + τ, the incumbent’s limit
price is c◦+τ,a n di t sm a r k u pτ. The second term is the return after the disruption interval.
In this period, the adopting rival has a cost c +τ<c ◦ +τ.F o rt h eﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sp e r i o d ,
the incumbent’s cost c◦ remains lower then c+τ, during which period the equilibrium price
is c + τ. Eventually, since c <c ◦ and since τ<c ◦ − c by assumption (since τ is assumed
“small”), a point is reached (i.e., c + τ = c◦) where the rival that adopts is the lowest cost
producer (including the friction τ) and the incumbent’s proﬁti sz e r of r o mt h a tp o i n to n .
Fourth Return: rSD






◦ − τ − c]dc,
since its limit price is c◦,a n di t sm a r g i n a lc o s ti sc + τ.
Willingness to pay in the switchover disruption case is given by
W
SD









18We begin by noting that for τ close to zero, it is immediate that vSD >i SD,s ow ec a n
ignore the idling possibility for the rest of this proof. So we compare vSD − uSD and rSD.
Note at τ =0they are equal. Let us diﬀerentiate the diﬀerence, vSD −uSD, with respect to
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and note that, at τ =0 , drSD/dτ = −Hbeyond.
If Hbeyond >H disrupt,t h e nf o rτ =0 , (10) is positive and greater than (11). This implies
that the incumbent has the highest willingness to pay for small τ.T h u sWSD
GN = vSD −uSD,
and this is strictly increasing for small τ, proving (i).
If Hdisrupt ∈ (Hbeyond,2Hbeyond), then (10) is strictly negative but still greater than (11).
Thus WSD
GN = vSD − uSD and is strictly decreasing for small τ,p r o v i n g( i i ) .
If Hdisrupt > 2Hbeyond, then (10) is strictly less than (11). So a rival has the highest
willingness to pay. So WSD
GN = rSD which is strictly decreasing, proving (iii). Q.E.D.
The above is a local result, holding around τ =0 . The next result (Proposition 4)
generalizes the two ways that big switchover costs overturn GN (which are parts (ii) and (iii)
of Proposition 3) to a wider range of τ. Before stating Proposition 4, we need to deal with
the complication that for certain parameters, it may be the case that the incumbent obtains
the rights to the innovation but then leaves it idle. The following lemma shows that if this
ever happens for any τ, it happens for all higher τ.
Lemma 1. Fix all the parameters of the model except for τ.I ft h e r ee x i s t sa n yτ where the
19incumbent obtains the new innovation rights but then idles it (and has a strict preference to
do so), there is a ˆ τ>0 such that for all τ<ˆ τ, the incumbent does not obtain and idle the
new innovation but if τ>ˆ τ the incumbent does obtain the rights and idles it.
Proof. See appendix.
Deﬁne ˆ τ = ∞ in the event that there is no idling for any τ. Proposition 4 requires an
additional assumption.
Assumption 1:A s s u m et h a tf0(t)eρt increases in t.
A few remarks about assumption 1. We earlier assumed that f0(t) < 0.N o w i f t h e
discount rate were ρ =0 , this assumption would be simply be that f00 > 0, i.e. that f is
convex such as in the example in ﬁgure 1. This would be a standard assumption in any
kind of learning over time setup where the initial advances come in at a faster rate than
later advances. If ρ>0,w en e e dm o r et h a nc o n v e x i t ys i n c et h eeρt term works against the
assumption (note f0(t) < 0).W en e e df to be convex enough. For example, if f(t)=ke−γt,
then we need γ>ρfor the assumption to hold. Assumption 1 directly implies that h(c)
decreases in c.7
With this setup, we can now generalize the two ways that big switchover costs overturn
GN (which are parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3) to a wider range of τ.
Proposition 4. As in Proposition 3, assume the Gilbert and Newbery setup applies, that
demand is perfectly inelastic and that there is a period of switchover disturbance (¯ c>c ◦).
Assume further that Assumption 1 holds.
(i) If Hdisrupt >H beyond, WSD
GN strictly decreases in τ for τ<min{c◦ − c,ˆ τ}.
(ii) If Hdisrupt > 2Hbeyond, a rival obtains the innovation for all τ<min{c◦ − c,ˆ τ}.
Proof.F o r τ<min{c◦ − c,ˆ τ}, by the deﬁnition of ˆ τ, the incumbent is not idling the





◦ + τ) − h(c
◦ − τ),i fc
◦ + τ<¯ c,
= −h(c
◦ − τ),i fc
◦ + τ>¯ c
Assumption 1 implies h0 < 0, so the above is strictly negative. Since Hdisrupt >H beyond,
7Recall that h(c) ≡ e−ρ(1−G(c))g(c) =- e−ρtf(t)−1,f o rt solving c = f(t).
20vSD−uSD is strictly decreasing for small τ. Since the function is strictly concave, it is then





where vSD−uSD and rSD are both decreasing functions
of τ. The maximum of decreasing functions is a decreasing function, proving (i). Next observe
from diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to τ that rSD is (weakly) convex. If Hdisrupt > 2Hbeyond,
the slope of rSD at τ =0is strictly greater than the slope of vSD−uSD.S i n c erSD is convex
and vSD − uSD is concave and since vSD − uSD = rSD at τ =0 , rSD >v SD − uSD for
τ ∈ (0,min{c◦ − c,ˆ τ}) as claimed. Q.E.D.
The intuition of the results for the Gilbert and Newbery structure can be gleaned from
a simple example. Ignore discounting by setting ρ =0 . Suppose that during the disruption
p e r i o d ,m a r g i n a lc o s ti si n ﬁnite, that is, c = ∞,s ot h a tn op r o d u c t i o nc a nt a k ep l a c e .O n c e
the disruption period is over, then marginal cost is c < (c◦ − τ). If the incumbent adopts




◦ + τ − c).
I ft h ei n c u m b e n td o e s n ’ ta d o p ts ot h a tt h er i v a lg e t si t ,i tm a k e sap r o ﬁto n l ya sl o n ga st h e











◦ + τ − c) − H
disruptτ.( 1 2 )
W ec a ne a s i l ys e eh e r et h a ti ft h eHdisrupt period is longer than the Hbeyond period, an
increase in τ will lower the incumbents willingness to pay for the innovation. Obviously, the
disruption period has to be quite big here, half of the entire period. But note that if we
add discounting, the disruption period need not be so long for the result to go through since
21the disruption is bourne up front. So adding discounting magniﬁes the eﬀect.8 Below we
illustrate another force that magniﬁes the eﬀect.
6E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we show our conclusions are robust to some straightforward extensions and
alternative interpretations.
Incumbent faces rivals in many markets (i.e. variation in τ)
In the case of a large switchover disruption, in the analysis above the incumbent loses its
entire market for a period of time. But in more general models, the incumbent need not lose
its entire market in order for the eﬀect we are talking about to go through.9 We illustrate this
here by allowing the incumbent’s advantage over rivals to be big in some markets, and small
in others. In this setup, even during the switchover disruption when the incumbent has
high costs it will nonetheless continue to sell to consumers over whom it has high monopoly
power. The incumbent will lose mobile consumers during the disruption and on account of
these mobile consumers our results will go through.
So now assume that there is heterogeneity in τ in the population of consumers rather
than all consumers having the same τ. Speciﬁcally, assume τ i sd i s t r i b u t e do nt h ei n t e r v a l
τ ∈ [0,¯ τ] with continuous density a(τ) and c.d.f. A(τ). W ec o n t i n u ew i t ht h ei n e l a s t i c
demand case, assuming the reservation price θ>¯ c +¯ τ, so equilibrium market quantity will
be unity as all consumers will buy in equilibrium. Assume that ﬁrms can perfectly price
discriminate and observe the type τ of each consumer. This simpliﬁes things considerably,
as we can determine the Bertrand Equilibrium in each market separately. This structure
can be given several interpretations. In terms of the tariﬀ example mentioned earlier, it may
s i m p l yb et h ec a s et h a td i ﬀerent consumers face diﬀerent tariﬀs. Or we can interpret this as
heterogeneity in transport costs in a spatial context with a Hotelling-like structure. We can
8Note that there are other forces that act like discounting that will also magnify the impact of switchover
disruptions. One example is if there is a small probability each “period” that the market disappears (for
example, because of the development of a substitute product).
9Another extension (besides the one we consider below) would be for the incumbent, upon adoption, to
be able to produce only a certain fraction y of its capacity for a period of time. We could assume during
this period it produced at marginal cost c (or c), and that once the period is over, it produced at c.
22put the incumbent in the center of a country. Buyers located in the center of the country
have high τ because in addition to paying any tariﬀ they have to incur transportation costs
to ship imports inland. Buyers located on the coast have lower τ.
Our results for the Arrow case directly extend to this generalization of the model. Con-
sider the return to adoption in the Arrow case. Let WSD
Arrow;many-markets denote the willingness
to pay in the new model (with many markets). To obtain this in the generalized structure,
we need only take the return WSD










Since from Proposition 1, WSD
Arrow(τ) is strictly decreasing in τ for τ<¯ c − c◦ and constant
above this, it is immediate that an upward shift in the distribution of τ (in the sense of
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance) strictly decreases willingness to pay.
Things are more complex for the Gilbert and Newbery case. Nevertheless, we can use
a continuity argument to show that Proposition 4 is robust to adding in a small amount of
heterogeneity in τ so that even right after adoption when the switchover disruption is at its
maximum, the incumbent retains some consumers (those with the highest τ).
Consumer Dynamics
Our consumer model features no dynamics. Fixing the prices of the incumbent and all
rivals, quantity sold by the incumbent is independent of history. There is a large literature
that emphasizes the importance of dynamics on the consumer side. Consumers may bear
“switching costs” when they shift from one provider to a second provider. If the consumer
goes ahead and makes such a switch, the ﬁrst provider might have a diﬃcult time getting
the consumer back. See Klemperer (1995) for a survey of this literature.
If we introduce these kinds of dynamics on the consumer side, the eﬀe c t sw ea r ei s o l a t i n g
here are magniﬁe d . W em a k eo u rp o i n tw i t has t y l i z e de x a m p l eb u to u rp o i n ti sm o r e
general. Suppose that when consumers purchase from a rival, there is some probability they
never will come back to the incumbent. Speciﬁcally, demand available to the incumbent
decays at rate δ when demand is met by a rival ﬁr m . I nt h i sc a s ew ec a nr e w r i t et h e








◦ + τ − c) − H
disruptτ.
This is the same as (12), except the ﬁrst term now includes a decay factor for consumers
lost over the course of the disruption interval (which has length Hdisrupt). In the original
analysis, δ =0is implicitly assumed. The comparative static that WSD







For any positive disruption interval Hdisrupt, the above condition will hold for large enough
consumer decay δ.
Uncertainty
The model is set up with a deterministic cost structure. Often there is a great deal of
uncertainty in the adoption of a new technology and this reinforces our point. It may be
that a new technology is worse than the existing one, even in the long run, but the only way
to ﬁnd out is to try it. Moreover, once a ﬁrm tries it, it may be stuck with it, at least for a
substantial period of time. For example, the adoption of a new baggage handling system in
the Denver airport turned out to be a mistake, but it took ten years before they abandoned
it.
We can capture this with a simple relabeling. Suppose that the model is a static one, in
which there is uncertainty about the realization c of a new technology. Assume that if the
cost draw ends up c>c ◦, the adopting ﬁrm is stuck with it–that is, the cost of reverting to
the previous technology is prohibitively high. If we simply let h(c) be the density of the cost
draw c for the new technology, the model is formally identical to the model studied, and all
of our results go through.
7C o n c l u s i o n
There is a rapidly growing body of evidence that shows ﬁr m si nm o r ec o m p e t i t i v ee n v i -
ronments are more likely to adopt technologies and increase productivity. This literature
includes Treﬂer (2004), Lewis (2004), Syverson (2004), Symeonidis (2008), Fabrizio, Rose
24and Wolfram (2007), Holmes and Schmitz (2001), Dunne, Klimek and Schmitz (2008) and
Schmitz (2005), to name a few.
Our theory can explain some of this evidence. In our theory, a ﬁrm that faces a signiﬁcant
decrease in market power may choose to adopt a technology that was widely available for
a long time. The reason is that the technology involves some switchover disruption and
the opportunity costs of disruption were too high with great market power. Let us close,
then, by brieﬂy discussing two episodes where ﬁr m s ,f a c e dw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nc o m p e t i t i o n ,
adopted technologies that had been available beforehand.
Iron Ore Mining. For nearly a century, until the early 1980s, the U.S. and Canadian iron
ore industries were the exclusive suppliers to steel plants in the Midwest manufacturing belt
(e.g., Chicago and Cleveland). At that time they faced a signiﬁcant increase in competition
in these markets. In response, they adopted a technology that led to a surge in productivity.
The technology was a change in organization, in particular, a change in work rules (see, for
example, Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002) and Schmitz (2005)).
Our theory provides an explanation. The ﬁrms could have instituted these changes prior
to the reduction in market power, but there would have been a switchover disruption, namely,
a likely protracted strike by the union. With signiﬁcant market power, and high iron ore
prices, the opportunity costs of lost sales were too high. With the surge in competition,
prices and rents fell dramatically. The opportunity costs of a protracted strike were now
much lower, and the ﬁrms decided to pursue new work rules. Its also quite possible that the
ﬁrms thought the possibility of a strike, and its duration if it did happen, had fallen as well.
But our model predicts this, too, is a force for technology adoption.
Cement Manufacturing. From the end of WWII until the early 1980s, U.S. cement
manufacturers faced very little threat of competition from foreign cement producers. In the
mid 1980s, cement imports surged, reaching as high as 30 percent of U.S. production in
the 1990s. In U.S. states on the coast, or with inland waterway access, the share was even
higher. In response to this increase in competition, cement producers adopted a technology
that led to a surge in productivity. In fact, TFP in this industry had been falling until the
surge in imports, and has since been growing. The technological change, again, was a change
in organization (in work rules) (see Dunne, Klimek and Schmitz (2008)). Again, our theory
25provides an explanation.
Overall, while the Arrow theory provides a possible explanation of why monopolies are
observed to be sluggish innovators, it does not seem to ﬁt the evidence particularly well.
Indeed, monopolists tend to be conservative in a great many ways. And indeed, this makes
sense: if you have a good thing going you do not want to rock the boat. The one thing
a monopolist fears most is the loss of monopoly.10 This is exactly the driving force that
explains why switchover disruptions can be so important: a competitor has little to fear
from a disruption as they are earning little to begin with. A ﬁrm with a lucrative monopoly
is well advised not to jeopardize it by adopting a technology that may in the short-run at
least, threaten its lucrative position.
10This is reﬂected in many contexts. For example, a patent may give nominal control over a technology.
But control of the technology itself is more important: it gives eﬀective bargaining power with the legislature,
courts and public — “enforce my monopoly or I will not share my technology with you.” If you are foolish
enough to license your technology and a licensee improves on it, now you are thrown back on the generousity
of the legal system. It is the rival who has the eﬀective bargaining power. A fairly good example of this was
when the U.S. Navy eﬀectively stripped the Wright Brothers of their monopoly during WWI — a rival with
a superior technology left them only with their legal claims, and those proved to be worth little in the face
of a government unwilling to enforce them.
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Note that at τ =0 ,iSD−uSD =0 ,w h i l evSD−uSD = rSD > 0.N e x tn o t ef o rτ ∈ (0,c−c◦),
that iSD−uSD is strictly increasing while rSD is strictly decreasing. For τ>c −c◦, iSD−uSD
is weakly increasing, while rSD is ﬂat. Hence if there is ever a point τ where iSD−uSD >r SD,
there is a unique cutoﬀ τ0 where iSD−uSD = rSD,a n diSD−uSD <r SD if and only if τ<τ 0.
If c◦+τ<¯ c, then the slope of iSD−uSD is strictly greater than the slope of vSD−uSD and
otherwise the slope is equal. Hence if there is ever a point τ where iSD−uSD >v SD−uSD,
t h e r ei sau n i q u ec u t o ﬀ τ00 where iSD −uSD = vSD −uSD,a n diSD −uSD <v SD −uSDif and
only if τ<τ 00.
If the points τ0 and τ00 don’t exist, then for no τ is there a strict preference to idle. If
both exist, then let ˆ τ ≡ max{τ0,τ00}. Q.E.D.
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